The controversy about sovereign debt cuts loomed prominently throughout crisis in the European Union (EU), as the EU legal rules were viewed to impose strict limitations on debt restructuring involving public creditors due to moral hazard concerns enshrined in the legal ban on bailouts. This analysis explores the economic plausibility of the legal regime, with the applicable legal standard capturing the impact of debt restructuring on the debtor's expected compliance with scal rules. Our theory shows that the eect of debt cuts on scal compliance depends on three eects, the direction of which determines the overall eect on expected scal compliance. We empirically review the plausibility of our theoretical results by exploiting survey data from members of state parliaments in Germany. Data limitations notwithstanding, our results oer some plausibility that haircuts can make scal compliance more attractive and likely.
Introduction
Haircuts are controversial instruments of sovereign debt restructuring. While being discussed for a long-time in relation to debt relief for developing countries (Das et al. 2012 ; Sturzenegger/Zettelmeyer 2006), haircuts have recently loomed prominently in the European sovereign debt crisis (Hofmann 2017; Steinbach 2016) . Debt restructuring has evoked comparatively less legal controversy where bonds held by private investors are concerned (Zettelmeyer et al. 2013 ), yet controversies centered around the request for Greek debt restructuring held by public creditors as precondition for nancial assistance the IMF insisted on debt restructuring involving public creditors, the EU opposed it due to legal boundaries. EU legal rules impede the scope for restructuring sovereign debt to the extent that EU institutions or EU Member States relinquish their creditor position. The no-bailout principle enshrined in EU law dictates strict scal responsability, and may hinder non-market based debt relief as having the equivalent eect of a debt bailout (Steinbach 2016) . Policy-makers opposing debt restructuring have invoked the EU no-bailout clause to sustain their refusal to agree to nominal cuts of Greek debt (Homann 2017). A recurrent argument associated with the application of the ban on bailouts is moral hazard concern infused by debt cuts undermining the debtor country's scal compliance eorts.
From a legal perspective, the lively discussion on the economic desirability of debt cuts for the purpose of Greek debt relief (Eichengreen et al. 2018 ) raises the question of whether the EU legal standards can claim economic plausibility. Since the EU legal benchmark is concerned about maintaining budgetary responsability and compliance with scal rules, our economic analysis seeks to assess the eect of debt cuts taking into consideration that moral hazard is relevant for a country's expected compliance with scal rules. The theoretical analysis shows that the eect of debt cuts on scal rule compliance depends on the sign and strength of three eects, which together determine the overall eect. The rst eect is the induced reduction in interest and principal repayment, which makes compliance with a scal rule more likely (direct static eect). The second eect is a dynamic eect, as a debt cut raises the expectation that future debt relief (here modeled as reduction in future interest rate on government debt) is induced (direct dynamic eect). The third eect captures expectations about the consequences on non-compliance with the rule, whose sign is ambiguous a priori (indirect eect). A debt cut increases the probability of compliance with the balanced budget rule if it lowers the perceived probability of soft consequences.
In the reverse case, the probability of soft consequences goes up, the rst two eects and the third eect move in opposite direction, making the overall eect of a debt cut on the compliance probability a priori unclear. Upon a debt reduction it becomes easier to comply because the scal burden from debt is relaxed, but at the same time the expectation for future debt relief rise as do the incentives to rely on soft consequences in case of scal rule violation go up, thereby making the net eect ambiguous.
On that basis, we examine the direction of the theoretically ambiguous eect empirically by looking at two dierent case studies. First we exploit survey data from two survey rounds of members of 16 state parliaments in Germany about the German debt brake, a national scal rule in Germany that limits state government to achieve a structurally balanced budget from 2020 onwards. The results suggest some plausibility that haircuts can make scal compliance more attractive and likely. The advantage of the German case study is that the expectations about scal rule violation are directly asked for (as captured by the indirect eect described above). A downside is that a scal rule in the German context is fairly specic and insights may not easily hold in other contexts. We therefore consider a second case, the recent (non-)compliance of Italy with the Stability and Growth Pact in 2018, which is much closer to the debate on hair cuts and moral hazard issues. While we do not know for sure the expectations of the new Italian government about the changes in the likelihood of soft or harsh consequences in case of violating the Stability and Growth Pact, we deduce from the the Italian government's budgetary plan for 2019 that the indirect eect moves in the same direction as the direct eects. However, since the budgetary plan was not fully accepted by the EU Commission, conclusions must be drawn with care. For our legal analysis, the results from the two case studies suggest re-visiting the legal interpretation given to applicable legal standards under EU rules. A limitation of our analysis is associated with the modelling of the debt cut as exogenous event, rather than allowing for endogenous factors to determine future debt cuts, which oers avenues for future research. nances. In addition, Reuter (2019) analyses the determinants of scal rule compliance. He nds that compliance with rules is higher if the rules are i) specied in terms of a stock rather than a ow variable, ii) xed in a coalitional agreement, and iii) cover larger parts of general government nances. We dier from those studies by looking at the expectations about the consequences of scal rule violations.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the legal framework applicable under EU law to debt restructuring. Section 3 oers a theoretical model capturing how the probability of compliance with a scal rules changes given a debt cut and initial bailout expectations. On that basis, we empirically explore the direction of eects from debt cuts. Section 4 infers from the results an economically sound interpretation of legal rules. Section 6 concludes. 3 
2

Legal framework
There are no legal barriers under EU rules as to the treatment of haircuts on private debt, with the private sector involvement of 2012 in Greece amounting to debt reduction of over 50% of 2012 GDP in Greece's debt stock (Zettelmeyer et al. 2013 2 Hence, by its purpose and spirit, the provision aims at maintaining budgetary discipline through market forces, as Member States are exposed to markets rather than counting on the support of other public entities. The purpose of the provision has led legal scholars to interpret the bailout prohibition as a ban on any measure lifting budgetary pressure exerted through markets (Adam/Mena Parras 2013; Borger 2013; Eichengreen 2011; Palmstorfer 2012). The credibility of the ban on government support is reected in the degree to which other governments would respond to a situation in which a Member State faces scal diculties. If the ban on nancial support is credible, the debtor would expect harsh consequences (i.e. denial of any non-market based debt relief ) in case of scal diculties, while reduced credibility makes soft consequences (i.e. scal leniency and willingness to oer non-market scal support) more likely. Credibility of the bailout prohobition translates into moral hazard concerns revolving around the incentives resulting from a debtor's expectation as to whether its budgetary and scal policy conduct triggers harsh (market-based) or soft (lenient non-market based) consequences (Ghosal/Thampanishvong 2013; Kahan/Leshem 2017). It is the moral hazard concern associated with debt relief that leads parts of legal scholarship to the conclusion that relinquishing debt would be incompatible with the legal bailout prohibition (Steinbach 2016; Hofmann 2017; Thiele 2017).
With the moral hazard concerns lying at the core of the legal prohibition of bailouts, one can use the moral hazard concept to determine the impact of debt restructuring on the debtor's expected compliance with scal rules. Moral hazard refers to the debtor's expectations to benet from a variety of possible scal reliefs such as, inter alia, exible implementation of scal rules, nancial support in scally dicult times, privileged scal treatment under nancial assistance programmes, or an annulation of parts of its debt (varying to the extent that debt haircut may modify this expectation). These expectations 1 Under ESM rules, there is even an explicit provision requiring private sector involvement in exceptional cases in accordance with IMF practice (ESM Treaty, recital 12). 2 It is acknowledged that the ESM rules also require that granting nancial support prerequisites an assessment whether public debt is sustainable and even expects the assessment, wherever appropriate, to be conducted together with the IMF (Article 13, para. 1 b) of the ESM Treaty). However, EU primary law as enshrined in the no-bailout clause not only adds further legal barriers to the debt sustainability analysis requirement, it would also ultimately override this requirement. In other words, even if the ESM's debt sustainability assessment of the debtor states would be positive, the assessment of the no-bailout clause has to be determined seperately and a violation of the no-bailout prohibition would render the nancial aid incompatible with EU law. over harsh or soft consequences can be determined as function of the level of existing debt.
Expectations associated with the credibility of prohibition of non-market based nancial support do have an impact on the debtor's scal policy in general and compliance record in particular, as they determine the incentives for debtors to comply with scal rules or to rely on scal leniency. However, while the relevance of these expectations for scal rule compliance seems intuitive, the question is whether the design of EU scal governance, encompassing a detailed set of scal rules rules, captures the expectations associated with the moral hazard concerns.
There is widely shared acknowledgement that the no-bailout principle aims to maintain budgetary pressure on states and to subject them to market discipline (ECJ 2012: Case C-62/14). Both jurisprudence and legal scholarship concur in that budgetary discipline is essential in a currency union where a country's scal conduct can create negative spillover effects on other Member States. Therefore, in the EU, the governance of budgetary discipline as safeguarded by the no-bailout clause has been gradually specied and complemented by a set of scal rules. Since its inception with the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the no-bailout clause in Article 125 TFEU was sidelined by scal rules limiting Member States' budgetary conduct, with scal rules adding a layer of operational scal standards to the bailout prohibition. Numerical scal rules underscore the rationale to desincentivize budgetary misconduct and to tie harsh consequences to it. Hence, the liaison of bailout prohibition subjecting states to market forces and scal rules was crafted with a view of safeguarding the overall stability of the currency union. In other words, no-bailout principle and scal rules represent a complementary scal framework in which the ban of bailouts stipulates the desirability of market pressure to materialize eectively and the scal rules mitigate the moral hazard concerns by reinforcing the negative consequences resulting from unsound scal conduct. However, given the track record of scal rule enforcement, the credibility of the no-bailout clause (i.e. the degree to which the debtor must expect harsh consequences as response to scal misconduct) has been considered rather weak since the introduction of the common currency (Atik 2016). Therefore, on various occasions, the scal rules have been gradually expanded and specied with the intention to compensate the limited credibility of the nobailout clause. This has led rst to the creation of Stability and Growth Pact (1997) and subsequently to scal rule tightening implemented by the Six Pack (2011) and the Two Pack (2013), and the Fiscal Compact for a large subset of EU countries (Armstrong 2013) all of these changes to the scal legal framework have been undertaken in order to strenghten the scal ties subjecting Member States to compliance control of national budgetary plan with EU scal standards. Essentially, extension of and compliance with scal rules has been viewed as pivotal to divert expectations of soft consequences in order to fully account for the normative claim of market-discipline as enshrined in the no-bailout clause. In light of the legal interrelatedness between the no-bailout clause and the operational scal rules, we can thus infer for the purpose of this analysis that compliance with scal rules oers a sound indication as to whether debtors expect harsh/soft consequences resulting from compliance and thus consider the bailout prohibition to be credible or not. In sum, the concept of moral hazard (as enshrined in EU rules) can be understood as concepts of expectations on future scal compliance. This approach is subject to two limitations. First, it does not exclude other motivations leading states not to comply with scal rules, such as political opportunity.
We allow for this consideration in our subsequent economic analysis. Second, our economic modelling does not capture moral hazard resulting from the endogeneity of debt cuts. Once debt has been restructured, states may count on future restructurings, which may modify its expectations on consequences of non-compliance with scal rules. 3 Economic Analysis of the Legal Problem 2) we therefore explore empirically the sign of this eect using survey data on compliance with the German debt brake.
A simple model
Our model is an adapted from Heinemann et al. (2016), who examine the determinants of compliance with a balanced budget rule. We consider an economy (for simplicity without economic growth and ination) with two periods t = 1, 2, in which the government budget
government expenditures excluding interest on debt by G, tax revenues by R, and the interest rate by i. The variable s represents a spending shock, whose density is f (s) and cumulative distribution function F (s). Assuming no spending shock in period 2, and dening the primary balance as tax revenues minus government expenditures (excl. interest payements) P = R − G, we can transform the government budget constraint and write it in terms of the budget decit d t
and
The government chooses the primary balance in the second period P 2 . The choice of the primary balance in period 1 is not considered here. 3 The shock s occurs in period 1 after P 1 is determined.
The government faces a balanced budget rule in period 2, which requires d 2 = i 1 D 1 −P 2 ≤ 0 or after substitution from (1)
The primary balance must not be less than interest payments on debt to fulll the balanced budget requirement. In period 2 the government has the option to comply with the balanced budget requirement (compliance), or to pursue a dierent policy that leads to non-compliance. We assume that an improvement of the primary balance is politically costly, which is captured in a cost function k(P 2 − P 1 ), with the properties k(P 2 − P 1 ) 0 when P 2 − P 1 0, and k > 0. A higher primary balance than in the previous period requires less spending or higher taxes which is assumed to be unpopular with voters. Because of these political considerations there is no reason to overachieve the scal rule, but rather to satisfy the balanced budget rule exactly when compliance (surperscript c) is targeted, that is,
Utility under compliance with the scal rule is given by the constant benet from rule compliance u minus the political cost of scal adjustment
By contrast, when not complying with the scal rule, the government obtains lower gross utility b(P 2 )u, where b(.) is a function of the primary balance in period 2 with the properties 0 < b(.) < 1 and b > 0. Under non-compliance the gross utility is lower than under compliance, therefore b < 1. b(.) is a positive function of the primary balance in that period: a higher primary balance leads to higher benets. The purpose of making the benet of compliance dependent on the primary balance (rather than having a at benet) is to reect the idea that the degree of deviation from the balanced budget requirement matters.
In addition, it guarantess an interior solution to the choice of the optimal primary balance in case of non-compliance. The potential advantage of non-compliance lies in lower political cost.
Thus utility from non-compliance when the primary balance is smaller than what it takes to comply with the scal rule, P 2 < P c 2 , is given by b(P 2 )u − k(P 2 − P 1 ), which is maximized 3 See Heinemann et al. (2016) for an endogenous determination of decit reduction in period 1, which in the present model corresponds qualitatively to the choice of the primary balance in period 1. with respect to P 2 . The optimal primary balance in case of non-compliance is given by the solution to the rst-order condition to this maximization problem and denoted by P nc 2 . The associated utility is
In period 2, after the shock s in period 1 has been observed, the government complies with the balanced budget rule if the utility in (5) is greater than in (6) , that is, U c ≥ U nc .
as some measure of the gross compliance gain, compliance is preferable if the gross gain from compliance outweighs the political cost of scal adjustment to meet the balanced budget, 
The threshold s * is thus the maximum realized scal shock that is consistent with balanced budget rule compliance by the government. If the realized spending shock is stronger, the government does not comply, while the opposite occurs when the shock is smaller than s * .
This feature of the model appears to capture the reality of scal rule compliance in the EU, in which both several rule violations as well as many years of compliance have occurred in the past.
From an ex ante perspective, that is before the shock s is realized, compliance with the scal rule is an uncertain outcome. The threshold dened in (7) can be used to write the probability of compliance p as p = F (s * ),
where F (s) is the cumulative distribution function of the scal shock. As can be seen from (7) and (8), a larger primary balance in period 1, P 1 , makes compliance more likely:
Moreover, a larger gross gain from compliance (=larger u) makes compliance also more probable because ∂k −1 /∂ u > 0, which can be seen by dierentiating the condition of indierence between compliance and non-compliance k(x) = u, where x = P 2 − P 1 . An increase in u, holding everything else constant, means it is more attractive to comply with the scal rule. Since k > 0, x must rise, which for given P 1
implies an increase in P 2 . The latter allows for a higher shock s to maintain the balanced budget condition in period 2, as can be seen from (4) .
We now turn to the main part of the analysis. We are interested in the eects of an exogenous debt cut, here understood as a reduction in the initial debt level D 0 . The debt cut is not endogenously derived, but rather assumed. The debt cut aects s * in three ways:
First, it makes compliance more likely as it reduces debt repayment and interest payments on initial debt, which in turn make it easier to achieve the decit target (direct static eect).
Second, it may raise the likelihood of future debt relief such as debt forgiveness or cuts in interest rates. Specically, we consider a reduction in the interest rate on D 1 , that is i 1 , which makes i 1 a function of D 0 with the property ∂i 1 /∂D 0 > 0 (direct dynamic eect). Given the legal framework, we assume that future debt cuts are conditional on Formally, we dierentiate (8) with respect to D 0 , and use (7), which leads to dp/dD 0 = f (s * )ds * /dD 0 , and obtain for the last term
The direct static eect, represented by the rst term in (9), leads to a positive compliance eect from a debt cut. Intuitively, it becomes easier to fulll the scal rule because lower interest payments in period 1 lead to a lower debt level D 1 carried into period 2, and thus allows for a lower primary balance in order to achieve a balanced budget. The second term is the direct dynamic eect on future debt/interest rate relief, which is non-positive, implying that an induced debt/interest rate relief in the future makes compliance (weakly) more likely.
Finally, there is also the indirect eect, the third term in (9) , which is more involved. We assume that an exogenous debt increase (or debt cut) inuences the expectations of the government about the consequenes in case of violation of the balanced budget rule. We think of soft or harsh consequences. An example of the former is that the government in violation does not face any negative consequences at all, possibly even receiving nancial support from the outside, such as a higher level of government support in a federation.
Alternatively, additional time may be granted to comply with the rules (as, for example, extra time for France granted by the EU Commission in recent years to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact). By contrast, harsh consequences are conceivable, such as the strict enforcement of rules, for example through an externally imposed budget director that takes the scal autonomy of the country away (akin to the troika in Greece's case).
We assume that the type of consequences of a rule violation are not known ex ante with certainty.
To implement this idea into our model, we assume that the utility level under noncompliance U nc is the weighted sum of the utilities under soft and harsh consequences. Specically, let U nc = qU nc sof t + (1 − q)U nc harsh , where q is the probabilily of soft consequences, which is a function of the initial debt level D 0 . On the one hand, a high existing debt burden may call for harsh consequences in order to provide proper incentives for reform, thus suggesting a negative functional dependence of q on D 0 . On the other hand, in a situation of high debt the enforcement is politically and socially more challenging in the country under consideration, and thus the relationship may be positive. Using the denition of U nc , and recalling ∆u = u − U nc , we can simplify (9) and write 4
We assume that in case of non-compliance the utility under soft consequences is higher than under harsh ones, which makes the last square bracket positive. Under this assumption the overall sign of (10) is negative if dq/dD 0 > 0, as then all three eects go in the same direction: A debt cut increases the probability of compliance with the balanced budget rule, formally that corresponds to ds * /dD 0 < 0. This case holds when the debt cut lowers the probability of soft consequences (i.e., an increase in initial debt makes soft consequences more likely). Put dierently, the debt cut increases the belief in harsh consequences of rule violation and thus makes compliance more likely. On the other hand, when dq/dD 0 < 0, the indirect eect moves in opposite direction of the two direct eects, making the overall eect of a debt cut on the compliance probability a priori unclear. In this situation, the debt cut raises the probability of soft consequences. Upon a debt reduction it becomes easier to comply because the scal burden from debt is relaxed, but at the same time the incentives to rely on soft consequences in case of scal rule violation go up, thereby making the net eect ambiguous.
We like to note that the dynamic eect shown above is only a shortcut for the more elaborate game that creditors and debtors may play in practice because in our model the future debt/interest rate relief eect is taken as exogenous. Ideally, this eect should be endogenized as well. As far as we know, there is no literature formally modeling compliance with scal rules in a fully dynamic strategic setup. The literature on the dynamics of bailouts, however, may provide some guidance. Chari and Kehoe (2016) show in their innite horizon model of a government that has the option to bail out a rm to prevent bankruptcy that governments that lack commitment can induce ineciencies through bailouts where none existed if governments could commit. In this sense, the bailouts today trigger further problems tomorrow. However, Salcedo et al. (2017) show that in a bailout context the equilibrium of an innitely repeated game can be better from a welfare perspective than 4 We disregard the eect of a debt change on the optimal primary balance in period 2 under noncompliance. This is justied if P 2 is optimally chosen after the bailout decision is announced, and hence the envelope theorem applies. the innite repetition of the one-shot game. In their model, expectations of future bailouts are used to improve incentives and reduce the incidence of crisis. We conclude from these two contributions that the precise modeling of dynamic interaction between government interactions and expectations about future interventions is crucial for the economic outcome and welfare consequences.
In any case, our theoretical model does not unambiguously resolve the question whether sovereign debt cuts improve scal compliance, but points to the importance of the perception on the inuence of debt cuts on the consequences in case of scal rule non-compliance. This suggests that further insights can be gained from empirical analysis.
3.2
Empirical illustration
Violation of the Debt Brake in Germany
Our theoretical analysis suggests that debt cuts tend to raise scal rule compliance due to the direct eects. The indirect eect may run counter to this, however, and could potentially overcome the direct eects. In this section we explore the direction of the indirect eect.
Our analysis is not a complete econometric test due to data limitations. Rather we like to shed some light on the indirect eect to illustrate the conceptual idea of our analysis.
To this end, we examine the scal rule compliance expectations of policy makers in In order to use this idea to shed light on our theoretical model several implicit assumptions are worth being emphasized. First, we assume that the eect of a tax cut and an expenditure/debt shock have simply the opposite eect on compliance expectations. Secondly, we assume that the scal shock from the refugee inow is generic in the sense that a scal shock of the same magnitude but of dierent nature would have the same eect. This need not be the case, as the inow of refugees may be more exculpable than other shocks because of the humanitarian character of the government intervention. While this is a legitimate aspect in the short run, we believe that it has only limited bite in our context. Due to the number of refugees and their dierent cultural background the integration of refugees into German society is a long term task that requires additional expenditures over many 5 State abbreviations are as follows: BB: Brandenburg, BW: Baden-Württemberg, BE: Berlin, BY, Bavaria, HB: Bremen, HE: Hessen, HH: Hamburg, MV: Mecklenburg Western Pomerania; NI: Lower Saxony, NW: Northrhine Westphalia, RP: Rhineland Palatinate, SH: Schleswig Holstein, SL: Saarland, SN: Saxony, ST: Saxony Anhalt, TH: Thuringia 6 The coding in the graph diers for the rst survey slightly from the one provided in Heinemann et al. (2016) , as the number of answered checked during the rst and second survey diered. In order not to bias the result from this eect alone, the coding used here was done the following way: any option checked in favor of weak enforcement lowered the index by -1, any option checked for strong enforcement was coded +1. 7 Asylum seekers and refugees are distributed by a formula to states.
years. Our survey question about the consequences of the debt brake violation starting in 2020 points also to a longer horizon. 8
The second survey was spread out from December 2014 until April of 2016, that is, some surveys were conducted prior to the border opening, while others afterwards. The allocation of states to a particular survey date was quasi-random, as both in the rst and second survey all surveys were conducted in such a way to be not too close before or after state elections.
Elections dates in Germany dier by state and are not related to the timing of immigration inow. We compare the reduction in the sanction index from the rst to the second survey from those states surveyed before with states surveyed after the peak refugee inow. This is in spirit of a dierence-in-dierence analysis that is common in economics. The nding is as follows: 9 It is notable that the reduction in the index was approximately twice as large in those states who were surveyed after the decision to open the borders for refugees in the summer of 2015. Given that tax increases or other spending cuts were not actively pursued in light of the immigration inow into Germany, we interpret the event as a negative scal shock comparable to a short term increase in debt. The survey data therefore suggests a positive correlation between debt and soft expected consequences in case of rule violation, that is dq/dD 0 > 0. In the context of our formal model, the nding supports the view that in the case of Germany the direct and indirect eects move in the same direction and thus make compliance in the scenario of a debt cut more attractive and likely.
We like to emphasize that the analysis of Germany's debt brake is meant to be illustrative only. It does not imply that in general sovereign debt cuts improve the compliance with scal rules. The example shows however, that the condition for sovereign debt cut to improve scal rule compliance is not implausible either. 8 As noted by the Independent Advisory Board to the German Stability Council (2015) in the context of Germany's compliance with the Fiscal Compact, a possible violation of the scal rule due to an unexpectedly large inow of refugees in 2015 would have been tolerable in 2016, but in subsequent years the additional expenditures would not be unexpected and would have to be funded permanently.This view has also been adopted by the European Commission (2018) in the application of the Stability and Growth Pact that provides for unusual events that are outside the control of the government, such as the refugee related expenditures. Deviations from the adjustment requirements towards the medium term objective can be granted only on a temporary basis, see European Commission (2018, section 1.3.2.5) 9 The result (available from authors upon request) nds some support in regression analysis using individual survey data: Policymakers that were surveyed after the peak of the refugee inow expect softer consequences when controlling for state individual characteristics (such as party membership, age, etc.) as well as state and survey wave xed eects. The spillovers from the use of exibility in the past, both in other countries as well as in Italy itself, correspond in a loose way to the direct dynamic eect in our comparative static analysis within the theoretical model (i.e. the reduction in the interest rate).
The increase in budget decits planned by the new Italian government was an order of magnitude greater than the granted exibility in the past however: the cumulative increase in the decit from the new baseline was 3.9 percentage points for the period 2019-21, compared to 1.8 percentage points for four years from 2015-2018. We note that the worsening of the scal position of Italy was in part due to a deterioriation of the economic situation, which was exogenous from the viewpoint of the new government and hence can be matched to the exogenous change in the initial debt level of our theoretical model, and in part due to the substantial increase in the planned decit as a result of the new policy agenda, which was clearly endogenous.
We now aim to deduce the sign of the indirect eect from this episode. Had the Italian government expected tougher consequences by the European Commission in response to the worsening of the scal position due to the decline in general economic conditions, the Italian government would have sticked to the scal plan outlined by the previous governmentor even tightened its scal policy beyond that plan. Instead the government shifted its budgetary plan in expansionary fashion late in 2018. This makes it somewhat plausible that the Italian government did not expect a higher probability of harsh consequences in response to the exogenous increase in government due to worsening of the economic environment, but rather the opposite, that is, the Italian government expected that soft consequences are more likely.
In the context of our model this means dq/dD 0 > 0, and implies that the indirect eect Of course, we cannot rule out that the compromise outcome was anticipated by the Italian government in the rst place, and the strongly expansionary budget plan was entirely a strategic bargaining tool in order to get more exibility. In that case the expectations of the new government about consequence of rule violation might not have changed as suggested. To the extent that the Italian government did not expect the tough stand by the European Commission, however, expectations that scal rule violations would not be sanctioned, gained traction and would be consistent with a particular outcome of our model. 4 Re-visited legal analysis 
Conclusions
Restructuring sovereign debt has become controversial throughout the EU sovereign debt crisis. Conventional legal interpretation of EU scal rules has considered the no-bailout principle to impose a prohibition of debt cuts considered as violation of that principle.
Our economic analysis sought to examine this legal standard by oering a theoretical and empirical framework which aimed to identify how moral hazard concerns translate into a country's future scal compliance. Our theoretical results suggest that no unambigous eect of debt cuts can be determined. On the one hand, debt cuts promote scal compliance in cases when the debt cut lowers the bailout probability in case of scal rule violation (i.e., when an increase in initial debt makes a bailout more likely). On the other hand, when a debt cut increases bailout probability, the overall eect of debt cuts become a matter of strength of opposing eects. On that ambigous basis, our empirical illustration, albeit limited due to data limitations, oered an plausible underpinning for the positive compliance eect of debt cuts by demonstrating that at least for the chosen example Germany the eects move in the same direction and thus sustain that debt cuts may promote scal compliance.
We draw policy implications from our analysis with the necessary caution in light of the ambiguity of our results. First and surely, our analysis underscores the need to re-visit the legal framework applicable to sovereign debt cuts, which must be designed to account for the eects from both a reduced burden of debt service as well as modied bailout expectations.
Second, the overall eect of a debt cut must be assessed on an individual case-by-case basis, which militates against the kind of categorical judgment on the suitability of debt cuts which is often put forward in the policy debate. And nally, further theoretical analysis is needed to better understand the dynamic eects of debt cuts on scal rule compliance, as debt cuts may trigger expectations of future debt foregiveness, which in turn may aect rule compliance.
